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This chapter offers the first in-depth study of both structural and 
agential factors behind the emergence and electoral breakthrough of a 
new radical left party in Slovenia, the Left. It defines the party’s 
ideological profile and it analyses its tactics of party competition 
through a selection of concrete examples. It concludes by outlining 
two possible trajectories for the future electoral and organisational 




The Left (Levica) is a relative newcomer in the Slovenian party system and the 
European Populist Radical Left (PRL) party family more widely. Formally established 
in March 2014 as a coalition party under the name of the United Left, it managed to 
surpass the 4% electoral threshold in the July 2014 parliamentary elections with 5.97% 
of the popular vote. The electoral result translated into six seats in a 90-member 
National Assembly, putting the new party on a par with the traditional party on the 
Slovenian Left, the Social Democrats, which was their worst electoral result since 
Slovenia’s independence in 1991.  
 
The novelty of the United Left was notable not only in terms of its electoral 
breakthrough in July 2014, but also regarding its founding organisational structure and 
its organic ties with new left social movements. The United Left was a coalition of three 
smaller parties and the ‘fourth bloc,’ which represented social movements and 
individuals: (1) Initiative for Democratic Socialism (IDS); (2) Democratic Labour Party 
(DSD); (3) the Party for the Sustainable Development of Slovenia (TRS); and (4) civil 
society movements and individuals. Without taking account of its beginnings in the 
2012 – 2013 anti-establishment protests in Slovenia, we cannot fully understand the 
key drivers behind the emergence of this new left-wing party. Yet, the party’s 
ideological and activist roots precede the protests, and they are closely tied with the 
fragmented, yet vibrant new left social movements that have animated the urban spaces 
of Slovenian civil society in the 2000s and early 2010s. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the emergence of the Left and its electoral 
breakthrough in 2014. The first part will focus on the movement-party phase of its 
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trajectory and will inquire into how the United Left managed to capitalise on the 
public’s growing anti-establishment sentiments by providing further insights into the 
political opportunity structure behind United Left’s success. It will do so through a 
multi-level analysis of the intersection between the 2012-2013 protests, wider structural 
conditions, the peculiarities of the political system and the dynamics of party 
competition. The second part will attempt to define the Left’s ideological profile by 
analysing its discourse in order to determine whether it is a democratic socialist or a 
populist socialist party. It will then outline an overview of the Left’s programmatic 
positions on socio-economic and cultural issues, as well its evolving stance towards the 
EU, with a special focus on its tactics which differentiate it from other party 
competitors. The third and final part will contrast the current ideologically more 
pronounced trajectory of the Left with an alternative populist, and ideologically lighter 
one, which could increase its chances of electoral success in the future. 
 
1. The political opportunity structure behind United Left’s success 
 
1.1 The 2012-2013 Slovenian protests as the populist rupture in Slovenian politics 
The short-lived movement that emerged during the 2012-2013 Slovenian protests 
marked the beginning of the trajectory that led to the establishment of the Left’s 
predecessor, the United Left. The mass protests in the winter of 2012, which were 
triggered by corruption allegations against the mayor of Maribor, Slovenia’s second 
largest town, swiftly spread to other parts of the country, widening the scope of 
protesters’ scorn to the whole of the political class. These protests were the largest in 
Slovenia’s short history of independence since 1991 and were widely seen as 
spontaneous and not organised by any of the trade unions or established political 
parties.  
 
With the people as the discursive nodal point and an antagonistic opposition against the 
whole political class, the ‘All-Slovenian People’s Uprisings’, as they came to be known, 
represented a pivotal populist rupture in the Slovenian political landscape. According 
to the minimal definition of populism (see Mudde 2004; Laclau 2005; Stavrakakis & 
Katsambekis; Katsambekis 2016), the centrality of a homogenous ‘people’ and anti-
elitism provide the key criteria of what constitutes populism in discursive and 
ideological terms. As the protests in Maribor and the capital of Ljubljana grew in 
numbers between December 2012 and April 2013, a discursive chain of equivalence 
was formed by uniting ideologically heterogeneous protest groups through a populist 
discourse which effectively differentiated the purity of popular sovereignty from the 
corruption of the existing political parties and politicians. Protest slogans, such as ‘It is 
over with him/them!’ and ‘They are all crooks!’ (Kirn 2014), represented a powerful 




While protest groups managed to agree on a set of mutually agreed demands by 
February 2013, including an end to austerity, the reform of the judiciary and the 
introduction of recall elections, they diverged on their analyses of the situation and the 
ways forward. The key short-term goal of the movement was for Prime Minister Janez 
Janša to step down, but views diverged over whether they should put efforts into 
demanding the same from the parliament, as well. More generally, the rejection of the 
political establishment as illegitimate led most of the protest groups to demand new, 
morally pure faces in politics, which they believed would be able to rise above the old 
left–right political divide and to find non-divisive solutions to identified problems.i This 
liberal technocratic narrative was influential in the movement, and it side-lined a more 
systemic critique of the relationship between the political class and the economic 
system. The latter narrative was driven most strongly by the Initiative for Democratic 
Socialism (IDS), which was one of the protest groups that formed during the popular 
uprisings. When the protest movement succeeded in toppling the corruption-ridden 
Prime Minister Janez Janša and his government, the fragile populist front of the 
movement eventually disintegrated.  
 
IDS was the main driving force behind the emergence of the Left’s predecessor, the 
United Left, and it was the only protest group to survive the 2014 election period. The 
question that needs to be addressed here is what IDS did right that other protest groups 
failed to do. In contrast to other protest groups, IDS effectively brought together 
ideologically similar individual and groups – some that emerged directly from the 
protests and some that had been active before – around a common set of ideas under 
the banner of ‘democratic socialism.’ Composed of members who were mostly young 
Marxist students and academics with previous activist experience in social movements, 
IDS possessed clear advantages, both intellectually and in terms of ideological 
cohesiveness over other protest groups. Intellectually, it developed its Marxist analysis 
through educational and research projects, such as the Workers and Punkers’ University 
and the Institute for Labour Studies, which is partly supported also by the Rosa 
Luxembourg Stiftung. Their activist experience in social movements (e.g. the anti-
globalisation movement, minority rights movement, anti-NATO protests, precarious 
workers movement and Occupy Slovenia) helped the members to test and develop their 
philosophical ideas in practice.  
 
Yet, it was also their past activist experience which made IDS members realise, during 
the 2012-2013 protests, that entering the electoral arena was the only way to cut the 
cord with the past impotence of the radical left in Slovenia.ii While the radical left was 
vibrant and rich in its activist experience, it failed to effect any substantive change to 
the neoliberal course that Slovenia had taken under past centre-right and centre-left 
governments. This important shift in the political organisation and the strategy of the 
Slovenian radical left was fundamentally influenced by the cotemporaneous experience 
of the indignados and Podemos in Spain and the aganaktismenoi and Syriza in Greece. 
Both examples showed that for radical left politics to have any effect on key political 
decisions it needed to be ready to march through the institutions and to compete with 
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established political forces in the electoral arena. By placing the Slovenian protests 
within the wider context of political developments in other parts of the European 
periphery, IDS realised that it needed to take a more organised form if it was to 
transform the political centres of power (IDS 2017). Two founding members explain 
that ‘[p]rotests as such have definitely caused history to speed-up and processes that 
would otherwise demand much more time have unravelled rather quickly’ (Korsika & 
Mesec 2014: 85–6).  
 
The 2012-2013 protests, therefore, opened up an opportunity for a strategic shift of the 
Slovenian radical left towards direct engagement with electoral politics. As it was 
undergoing a process of formalization as a registered political party, IDS sought to ally 
with other ideologically similar political groups to surpass the fragmentation of the 
radical left and to form a coalition, leading to the establishment of the United Left in 
March 2014. Going back to the question I raised above, it can be said that past activist 
experience and the ideological coherence of IDS and its sister parties gave to the Left 
an organisational and motivational advantage over other protest groups and enabled it 
to capitalize on the anti-establishment feeling. The latter groups either disintegrated or 
they formed pre-electoral coalitions with established political parties. In the next 
section, I focus on the structural and meso-institutional factors that can help explain the 
electoral breakthrough of the Left in the 2014 parliamentary elections.  
 
1.2 Wider structural conditions, party system rules and party competition 
In order to understand why the pivotal 2012-2013 protests erupted in the first place and 
what contributed to the electoral success of the Left in the 2014 parliamentary elections, 
we need to introduce into our analysis more explanatory variables. Following Paolo 
Chiocchetti (2017), I identify three interrelated variables: (1) wider structural 
conditions; (2) party system rules; and (3) party competition.iii 
 
(1) After the declaration of independence in 1991, successive Slovenian governments 
followed a strategic middle path between ‘the shock doctrine’ of rapid liberalisation 
and privatisation of state assets, which was implemented in many other post-socialist 
states in Eastern Europe, and the Yugoslav model of state-managed economy. This 
gradualist approach to the transition to a capitalist free market economy lasted until 
2004, when Janez Janša’s first coalition government accelerated privatisation and 
market-friendly reforms. When Slovenia entered the Exchange Rate Mechanism II 
(ERM II) in 2004, the inflow of foreign credit increased greatly. This offered Slovenian 
banks cheap access to capital, and it triggered a pronounced shift in the predominantly 
state-owned bank financing from deposits to foreign capital markets (Furlan 2014). 
When the financial crisis hit the global economy in 2008-2009, the Slovenian export-
oriented economy ‘witnessed a sharp fall in export performance (the exports decreased 
by 16.1% in 2009) and a devastating decline in economic growth (GDP dropped by 
7.9% in 2009)’ (Furlan 2014). This caused the construction and real estate bubbles to 
burst. Many enterprises went bankrupt and highly indebted companies accumulated 
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losses on banks’ balance sheets. A sovereign debt crisis ensued as governments took on 
the debt by increasing the state’s deposits (‘state recapitalisation’) in the banking 
system (Furlan 2014). 
 
The economic downturn provoked a swift rise in unemployment (from 4.4% in 2008 to 
10.6% in 2013). This had a knock-on effect on the deteriorating living standards for 
ordinary Slovenians. Lacking the power to facilitate exports by means of external 
devaluation after the adoption of Euro in 2007 and accumulating public debt, both 
centre-right and centre-left governments introduced austerity measures (cuts to public 
spending) and market-friendly structural reforms. Welfare reform restricted the criteria 
for obtaining social security benefits, and some transfer payments were reduced or 
eliminated. Together with labour market and pensions system reforms, these factors 
increased the risk of poverty and social exclusion for vulnerable groups, especially lone 
parents, the elderly and the unemployed (Filipovič Hrast & Ignjatović 2014). 
 
The public in Slovenia has traditionally been highly pro-egalitarian and supportive of 
the redistributive role of the state, with positive attitudes towards redistribution being 
quite constant over time at around 80% (Rus & Toš 2005; Toš 2016). Although 
Slovenia maintained one of the lowest levels of income inequality in the OECD (a Gini 
coefficient of around 0.24), the economic crisis had a notable effect on the public’s 
perception of their livelihoods. There has been a clear rise in those who think that the 
cause of poverty is structural (too much injustice in society) rather than individual 
(people are lazy and lack willpower): from 42% in 2007 to 61% in 2010 (Filipovič 
Hrast & Ignjatović 2014: 610). The rise in perceptions of injustice has been 
accompanied by a growing dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions in the 
country, with less than a third expressing their satisfaction with the functioning of 
democracy between 2004-2016 (Rus & Toš 2005; Filipović Hrast & Ignjatović 2014; 
Toš 2007; Toš 2016). Trust in the parliament and political parties has also declined 
further during this period. This decline accounts for heightened critical attitudes 
towards established political elites, a key driver behind the 2012-2013 protests.  
 
In his study, Niko Toš has noted that the aggravation of living conditions for many 
ordinary Slovenians also contributed to a more negative public attitude towards 
capitalism and a more positive attitude towards socialism (Toš 2016: 527). In fact, 
between 1995 and 2013, public support for capitalism has been steadily falling and has 
constantly been lower than support for socialism. This trend became even more 
pronounced with the aggravation of the economic crisis in Slovenia after 2011. 
Considering these structural trends altogether, we can see more clearly how economic 
and political performance affects the public’s perception of political elites and 
institutions, and how people’s willingness to switch party allegiance (or not to vote 
altogether) might increase as a result (see Kustec Lipicer & Henjak 2015). It also helps 
us explain how the Left, with an ideologically coherent message, managed to pull off 
an electoral success when political forces on the radical left in other post-socialist 




(2) Before I turn to analysing the success of the Left in relation to its party competitors, 
I first need to outline another explanatory variable, which eased the process of 
establishing a new party in the Slovenian electoral system and provided support for 
party competition: party system rules and dynamics. The Slovenian electoral system is 
proportional, with a relatively low parliamentary threshold of 4% which makes the 
system considerably more open to new political parties than first-past-the-post electoral 
systems. As a result, the Slovenian electoral system makes room for the existence and 
the participation of many, including small size, political parties (Kržan 2007). 
According to the Political Parties Act, a political party can be established with the 
support of at least 200 adult citizens. Political parties rely mostly on public funds. The 
amount of public money they receive is determined by their electoral performance in 
previous parliamentary elections. Both parliamentary and non-parliamentary groups are 
eligible, as long as they gain at least 1% of the vote in the previous elections. Alongside 
public funds, political parties in Slovenia are financed also from membership fees and 
donations. However, this represents only a moderate amount, compared to the 
substantial funding they get from the public budget (Kustec Lipicer & Henjak 2015). 
Newly established political parties have the right to claim funds from the public budget, 
as long as they receive at least 1% of the vote (or 1.2% if running on a joint-list with 
another party and 1.5% if running together with two or more parties).  
 
Alongside the relatively open and publicly supported system of political parties, media 
access and exposure also play an important role. As Katja Agrež (2016) outlines, mass 
media exposure is particularly important for new political parties. While mass media 
raises their public visibility and awareness through reporting, opinion polling and 
prominence in media coverage can also affect voter preferences and prompt ‘band-
wagon effects’ (Rothschild & Malhotra 2014). The personal qualities of a leader have 
also become increasingly prominent in light of the mass mediatisation of politics. This 
is reflected in instances where political leaders score higher ratings than their own 
parties (Kropivnik & Zatler 2002) or when the charisma or integrity of a leader 
increases the publicity and voter preference for new party challengers (Sikk 2011; 
Lucardie 2000). Indeed, three days before the election day in 2014, the commercial 
television channel with the highest ratings in Slovenia, POP TV, hosted the last TV 
debate between the leaders of political parties which enjoyed the highest support in 
opinion polls (minimum around 2-3%). Luka Mesec, the young leader of the Left,iv was 
the biggest surprise of the evening, coming second in the public perception of 
trustworthiness among nine party leaders who participated. His popularity started to 
grow as the debate moved to the topic of privatisation in the second part of the show 
(24UR 2014). Many commentators have attributed the electoral breakthrough of the 
party to his good performance in the television debate, which was also demonstrated by 





(3) Party competition is the third element that needs to be taken into account. As Allan 
Sikk fittingly notes, new political parties ‘have been particularly numerous and 
successful in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe’ (Sikk 2011: 467), 
and Slovenia is no exception. Despite the relative openness of the party system and the 
resulting fragmentation of the parliamentary arena, Simona Kustec Lipicer and Andrija 
Henjak note there has been ‘a high degree of party stability, with parties creating stable 
organisations, membership bases and political identities’ (Kustec Lipicer & Henjak 
2015). While the stability of the party system was traditionally maintained by the 
dominance of the left-liberal bloc, with the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) at 
the helm up until 2004, from then onwards the political system has been increasingly 
polarised between the conservative Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and a splintering 
of the LDS into new parties (Kustec Lipicer & Henjak 2015). The party system has 
become more unstable with the worsening of the economic crisis. Instability reaching 
its peak with the 2011 and 2014 elections, which disrupted the bipolarity between 
established centre-right and centre-left elites (see Tables 1 and 2 below). The once 
dominant LDS was left out of parliament in 2011, its voters shifting to the newly 
established centre-left party Positive Slovenia (PS), led by the popular Ljubljana mayor 
Zoran Janković. The corruption charges against Zoran Janković (PS) and Janez Janša 
(SDS) in February 2013 and the 2012-2013 protests shook up the political landscape 
once again. The PS splintered and a new personalistic party won the centre-left vote, 
the Modern Centre Party (SMC), led by Miro Cerar. Kustec Lipicer and Henjak (2015) 
describe the period following the 2008 parliamentary elections as characterised by a 
phenomenon of ‘single-term parties, emerging and disappearing from one election to 







Given this instability of parliamentary politics, we can see how the (centre-) left 
political space was in a constant shift during this period. Traditionally, it was dominated 
by LDS, then by the Social Democrats (SD) between 2008 and 2011, and then by new 
personalistic parties (PS and SMC). A key factor for the electoral success of the Left in 
2014 was the cotemporal decline of the Social Democrats and the demobilisation of 
their voter base. When they were in government between 2008 and 2012, SD adopted 
a number of neoliberal structural reforms in its key policy areas (welfare, labour market 
and the pensions system), which were very unpopular with the electorate. As a result, 
many of its voters felt abandoned. This created a political opportunity for a new party 
to fill the vacuum. Although SMC was perceived as the new party which would take 
over the centre-left ground in 2014, its centrism was strongly predicated on an 
ideologically vague moralism, which was also aimed at disenchanted right-wing voters. 
Its ideological-programmatic ambivalence entailed that during the election campaign 
the party did not crystallise its position on many issues important to left-wing voters, 
making again room for a more ideologically coherent left-wing force. It is in this 
context of party competition that the Left as a new left-wing challenger, which 
represents the interests of the working class and marginalised groups, was able to enter 
the parliamentary arena. 
 
If we consider all three explanatory variables together, it is difficult to determine 
precisely which was the more influential behind the Left’s success. Sikk (2011), for 
instance, argues that the simple appeal of ‘newness’ may be enough to account for the 
success of new parties, and that a party’s ideological clarity and social cleavages may 
not matter so much. He adds that this might be the case especially in the context of the 
de-ideologised political competition that characterises contemporary democracies 
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(Sikk 2011: 467). Contra Sikk, I argue that while the appeal of newness arguably did 
play a role in the 2014 parliamentary election, especially with regard to the victory of 
SMC, this argument is insufficient to explain the success of the Left. Miro Cerar, the 
leader of SMC, was a highly respectable and recognisable figure in Slovenian civil 
society, while Luka Mesec, the leader of the United Left, had been unknown to the 
general public. The Left, and its leader, only gained higher visibility with a persuasive 
and ideologically coherent political manifesto. For this persuasiveness to be registered 
among the general public, both the relative openness of the media space to new parties 
and policy proposals that resonated with the zeitgeist of the period were crucial. 
Therefore, the three explanatory variables should be considered in a complementary 
and inter-related manner.   
 
2. Between populism and socialism: ideological profile, programmatic positions 
and strategy  
In this section, I analyse the ideological and programmatic profile of the Left and its 
strategies of cooperation and competition with other political parties. The ideological 
profile will be analysed in terms of the ideological relationship between socialism and 
populism, with a special focus on the discursive construction of ‘the people’ in the 
Left’s discourse. 
 
(1) The Left presents itself as a democratic eco-socialist party. This is evidenced by 
their membership in the Party of the European Left, which brings together democratic 
socialist and communist parties around Europe. Yet, from its very inception, the Left 
has been perceived by its party competitors and the commercial media also as a left-
populist party. The populist label has been almost exclusively used in a pejorative way, 
especially when employed by its competitors on the centre-left to discredit the Left as 
a bunch of idealists and ‘random street people,’ a reference to their roots in the 2012-
2013 protests (Vičič 2015). The negative connotations around the term explain in part 
why the Left has not readily appropriated the populist description in the way that Jean-
Luc Mélenchon did, for example, in France. The semantics surrounding the populist 
signifier ‘the people’ in Slovenian points towards an explanation as to why the Left 
finds it hard to brand itself as populist, even though its discourse does carry populist 
elements. In Slovenian, the term ‘the people’ (ljudstvo) carries strong ethno-nationalist 
undertones, which is reflected in the more common usage of the word ‘nation’ (narod) 
when referring to the people. This perhaps explains why the Left’s discourse refers 
more often to ‘the ordinary people,’ which in Slovenian is plural (navadni ljudje). The 
signifier ‘ordinary’ people in the Left’s discourse is heterogeneous. It is pluralist in the 
sense that it is inclusive of people regardless of their race, ethnicity, religion, age, 
gender, (dis)ability and sexuality. And it carries strong class undertones, appealing to 





At a more philosophical level, the reticence to embrace the populist label might also 
have to do with the Marxist analysis that heavily informs the Left’s programme and the 
discourse of many key figures in the party. Marxism has historically entertained a 
difficult relationship with populism. While they both share a strong anti-elitism, 
Marxist philosophy often presented itself as a refined version of conflict theory, 
whereas populism (of the peasants, for example) was treated only as a rudimentary form 
of (evolving) class/socialist consciousness. This is because the populist construction of 
the radical subject (‘the people’) lacked a systemic analysis and failed to bring into play 
an account of the economic relations of power underpinning elite rule. However, as the 
limitations of the Narodnik movement in the 1870s demonstrated, for example in the 
Russian Empire, revolutionary socialist ideals are often at odds with non-proletarised 
dominated groups, and this makes it difficult to establish a more hegemonic role for 
socialist ideas without education and proselytising from the intelligentsia. As many 
scholars of populism have noted, populism is often opposed to the role of intellectuals 
in society, as they are seen as far removed and out of touch with the common sense of 
the people.v As I will show in the last section, this might present a problem for the 
future strategy of the Left in broadening the popular support for its message.  
 
With regard to the strong class-based analysis that characterises the Left’s discourse, 
the party at first sight easily falls into the democratic socialist parties category 
according to Luke March’s typology of far left parties (March 2008). Yet, its use of 
anti-elite and anti-establishment discourse, its beginnings in the 2012-2013 anti-
establishment protests, and the perception of the party espouses among its competitors 
place it closer to the populist socialist parties category. The Left’s support for 
democracy, the inclusion of marginalised and excluded groups (refugees, immigrants, 
LGBT and the unemployed), the rejection of both totalitarian communism and 
neoliberal social democracy, and a strong anti-elite and anti-establishment position can 
be said to position the party somewhere in between democratic socialist parties and 
populist socialist parties. Because its socialist ideological core is stronger than its 
populist appeal, it cannot be simply situated in the latter group. Its discourse and 
ideological profile convey, therefore, both the hard socialist ideological core and the 
ideologically lighter populist appeal.  
 
(2) The next section will analyse how this heterogeneous ideological profile translates 
into the party’s programmatic positions on socio-economic and cultural issues, as well 
as its stance towards the EU and other international/transnational collaboration. The 
Left’s 2014 political manifesto reads more as a collection of policy guidelines and 
justifications, divided into 16 different points, rather than as a set of precise policy 
proposals, with a few exceptions. Most of the points in the manifesto (11 out of 16) 
have a clear socio-economic dimension: 
Table 3. The Left’s key manifesto positions (United Left 2014) 
Socio-economic positions Cultural (and other) positions 
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1. Immediate halt to austerity 
measures 
2. State assistance for enterprises, 
halt to privatisation 
3. Workers’ management in 
enterprises 
4. Public oversight of banks 
5. A coordinated economy towards 
full employment 
6. Solution to the problem of debt 
through the establishment of an 
independent debt audit 
7. Fair tax reform through capital 
income taxation 
8. Fight against tax havens 
9. Protection of the welfare state 
10. Democratic and participatory 
public finance 
11. Sustainable food production 
12. Direct democracy and 
transformation of the state 
13. The extension of personal 
freedoms and rights 
14. Towards an ecological shift 
15. Commitment to peace and 
demilitarisation 
16. Demand German reparations for 
World War II 
 
 
Some more concrete policy proposals that can be found in the political manifesto gained 
wide media attention during the 2014 election campaign, especially the 1:5 ratio for 
limiting income disparities in the public sector and state-owned enterprises. Between 
2014 and 2016, the Left’s biggest achievement as a small political party with only six 
MPs in a 90-member parliament was its ability to push new issues onto the political 
agenda and up for parliamentary debate. By introducing motions to reverse austerity 
measures, to ensure state provision of free lunch meals for all school children, to 
legalise marijuana, to enact same-sex marriage equality, to stop the adoption of new 
free trade agreements and to guarantee the rights of refugees under international 
conventions, the Left was able to exert considerable pressure on the centre-left coalition 
government of PM Miro Cerar and to change the terms of the political debate. Despite 
being in opposition, the Left has managed to put into practice some of its political goals 
by building partnerships with civil society groups (issue-specific interest groups, trade 
unions, individual activists, artists, etc.), by organising press conferences and by tabling 
of bills and amendments of bills. 
 
While the party’s call to exit NATO has been clear from the very start, its position on 
the EU/Eurozone has been evolving together with the developments in the wider 
regional context. Learning from the experience of Syriza in 2015 and its failure to 
present a decisive alternative to the Troika’s austerity and structural reforms 
programme, the Left has joined other political parties at the European level to work 
towards ‘A Plan B in Europe.’ The plan consists of a double strategy: one that aims 
towards a complete renegotiation of the European Treaties and the democratisation of 
the EU structures (Plan A); and another focused on building an alternative international 
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infrastructure for monetary and economic governance outside the Eurozone (Plan B). 
In order to fend off blackmail from opposing political and economic forces, Plan B’s 
objective is to strengthen the negotiating position of participating members. Alongside 
this transnational initiative, the Left’s internationalist perspective goes even further. By 
sending its delegates to regional and international conferences, it seeks to share its 
experiences with other left-wing political groups, while building and developing new 
international collaborations. 
 
(3) The following section will analyse how the Left as a small opposition party attempts 
to translate its programmatic positions into practice. In order to assess the success or 
failure of specific policy initiatives, it is important to take into account the dynamics of 
party competition/cooperation and how this shapes the Left’s strategy in the parliament. 
Using Sikk’s extended typology of party competition and new political parties (Sikk 
2011), originally put together by Paul Lucardie (2000), I lay out the Left’s 
parliamentary strategy in conjunction with two analytical markers: (1) ideological 
motivation, and (2) whether a policy niche is shared by an established party. In the first 
part of this section, I have already posited that the party’s ideological motivation is 
strong, rather than weak. This means that the party advocates for an ideologically 
cohesive and comprehensive set of policies (Sikk 2011: 466). With regard to the second 
marker, the Left occupies mainly the position of a challenger, attempting to purify and 
claim a niche from an established party (SD and other parties on the left of centre). On 
some issues, it also takes the position of a prolocutor, by representing a particular issue 
or an interest in society, but only when such an issue is compatible with the party’s 
ideological profile.  
 
Data analysis of the Left’s voting record at the aggregate level over the course of the 
2014 parliamentvi shows that the party has voted mostly together with other opposition 
political parties, irrespective of their ideological profile, and against the coalition 
parties. Yet, when the analysis proceeds on an issue-by-issue basis, four types of 
parliamentary dynamics can be identified. Each type will be outlined by giving a 
concrete policy example. 
 
(a) Cooperation with opposition parties on a shared matter of public concern. 
When amendments to the proposed reform bill on social assistance were 
separately tabled by SDS (the main centre-right opposition party) and the Left at 
the 25th ordinary parliamentary session, both opposition parties voted together to 
support each other’s amendments, despite their ideological divergence. Although 
with the proposed reform bill the government was already relaxing the stringent 
eligibility criteria for social assistance, the Left and SDS attempted to achieve 
further relaxation. In the end, their amendments were voted down by the 
government coalition parties, and the reform bill was adopted without the support 




(b) Competition with government parties on a (non-)shared matter of public 
concern. Responding to MP Marjan Dolinšek’s (SMC) proposal to establish a 
new public holiday, which would mark the day the last Yugoslav People’s Army 
troops left Slovenia, the Left tabled an alternative amendment to bring back 2nd 
of January as a public holiday. As part of Janez Janša government’s austerity 
programme in 2012, the public holiday of the 2nd of January was abolished. 
When the Left tabled their amendment to bring the public holiday back in force 
February 2015, it was defeated in the parliamentary committee. In December 
2016, SMC reconsidered the proposal and proposed its own amendment to restore 
2nd of January as a public holiday. Many critics viewed the tactic as a populist 
gesture in view of the upcoming 2017 presidential elections and 2018 
parliamentary elections.  
 
(c) Cooperation with government parties on a shared matter of public concern. 
In December 2014, the Left introduced an amendment to the Marriage and Family 
Relations Act, which would legalise same-sex marriage. Despite declaring his 
support for LGBT rights, PM Miro Cerar hesitated at first to offer the 
government’s support for the proposed amendment as the government was 
planning to introduce its own version of the reform. With a simple amendment, 
however, the Left overtook the government. Pressure from progressive civil 
society groups and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), 
led the government to support the amendment introduced by the Left. With the 
backing of other centre-left parties, the amendment was passed through the 
parliament.  
 
(d) Competition with opposition parties on (non-)shared matter of public 
concern. In December 2015, the government approved the draft of the reformed 
International Protection Act and referred it to the parliament. While the new act 
largely preserved the regulations on international protection that were already in 
place, it introduced some controversial restrictions in order to tighten the 
eligibility criteria to claim asylum. Whereas the Left endeavoured to mitigate the 
proposed restrictions with its amendments, SDS aimed to tighten them further. 
While SDS was successful with its more restrictive amendment to the law in the 
committee stage, the final draft was amended by the government parties and 
restored to its original form, after the outcry of the Amnesty International 
Slovenia and other human rights NGOs, and it passed with opposition from the 
Left and boycott from SDS and NSi. 
 
The terms in which the Left opposes mainstream political forces are, hence, 
ideologically motivated and in line with its manifesto commitments. It is interesting to 
note that whenever the Left challenges the government coalition parties on socio-
economic grounds and it questions the economic liberal status quo, it is denounced as 
‘populist.’ Yet, when the party acts to uphold political liberal principles (protection of 
minorities and constitutional liberties) and takes on its prolocutor role, the populist label 
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is absent. The marriage equality and the refugee rights examples demonstrate that on 
cultural issues the Left puts pressure on other liberal and centre-left parties to be 
coherent and consistent with their declared liberal principles. The Left’s effectiveness 
can be also observed in the pressure it exerted on SD towards adopting a more liberal 
position on cultural issues (e.g. legalisation of marijuana) and a democratic socialist 
stance on economic issues (e.g. workers’ representation on Slovenia’s public holding 
group that runs privatisation processes). These party competition dynamics point 
towards the formation of an anti-populist front in Slovenian politics, a phenomenon that 
has been witnessed in other European countries as well, especially in the aftermath of 
the European sovereign debt crisis (see Katsambekis 2014; Medarov 2015). The anti-
populism of the centrist SMC and centre-left parties is activated whenever any political 
force moves away from the prescribed (neo)liberal policy repertoire, supported by the 
EU institutions and the IMF.  
 
Political polarisation therefore takes place along two antagonistic frontiers. The first is 
the traditional right-left divide. Contrary to some other Central and Eastern European 
countries, the right-left axis persists in Slovenian politics and it is well established 
(Fink-Hafner & Deželan 2016: 474). The second is the nascent anti-populism of centrist 
parties, which has not yet consolidated around a clear set of signifiers. For now, it is 
activated opportunistically to delegitimise the demands raised by the Left. Yet, this may 
very well change on the way to the 2018 parliamentary elections, as the anti-populist 
front closes ranks to stave off any further electoral gains by the Left.  
 
Overall, the Left’s parliamentary strategy and tactics are influenced by its ideological 
motivation and by whether a policy niche is shared by competitor parties as well. With 
regard to other opposition parties, which are mostly right-wing in the current 
parliament, the Left’s strategy is to cooperate on the issues that are ideologically aligned 
with its own programmatic positions, most commonly on socio-economic issues. With 
regard to other centre-left parties, which are in government positions in the current 
parliament, it tends to compete on issues of socio-economic nature and to cooperate on 
cultural issues, depending on whether the governing parties are ideologically consistent 
with their declared liberal position.  
3. The changing organisational and ideological trajectory 
The final section of the chapter examines the degrees of radicalisation and moderation 
of the Left after its presence in parliament for more than two years. I also consider the 
party’s changing trajectory in ideological and organisational terms, the ensuing 
difficulties, and whether the party’s discourse will move from the hard socialist 
ideological core to an ideologically lighter populist discourse.    
 
The growing learning experience and aptitude in manoeuvring through the 
parliamentary arena have activated a tendency towards higher centralisation and 
systematisation of internal party decision-making. While the Left’s MPs have acted 
uniformly and without much friction in the parliament, the situation was more tense in 
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the internal structures of the Left’s coalitional formation. There were frequent 
organisational, and sometimes ideological, disagreements between the four constituent 
parts that composed the United Left: DSD and civil society groups on the one hand, 
and TRS and IDS on the other. IDS itself was beleaguered with internal infighting along 
ideological lines. At IDS’ annual congress in April 2015, a faction of the party accused 
the leadership of not being socialist and radical enough, warning that the party was 
headed towards the same fate as other established political parties. DSD changed its 
name to ‘United Left-Democratic Labour Party’, while accusing IDS and TRS of 
usurping the control of the United Left brand.         
 
The tensions within the coalition became only more critical once the leaderships of TRS 
and IDS moved ahead with their plans to transform the United Left into a single political 
party. The two parties justified the unification plans on the grounds of enhanced 
organisational and decision-making efficiency, better management of available 
resources, and streamlining of engagement activities with supporters at the local level. 
For example, in the older organisational structure, if a supporter wished to become a 
member of the Left, they were unable to do so. They could only become members of 
one of the three coalition parties. This organisational structure, although it has its merits 
(i.e. a hybrid link with social movements and more open structures), proved to be 
inefficient electorally and confusing among (potential) supporters. The key concern 
among those opposing unification was that the United Left would no longer be any 
different from other established political parties and it would become more 
moderate/conservative as a result. This would have also meant a betrayal of the original 
aims of the party, which presented itself as an alternative model to ‘politics as usual’ 
by espousing democratic, consensual and open internal structures. 
 
By March 2017, TRS members voted in favour of the plans to unify the United Left. 
Between the April 2015 annual congress and March 2017, many of the rebellious 
members opposed to the unification of the United Left’s coalition left IDS. In May 
2017, the IDS leadership took the unification plans to an online vote, which were 
confirmed by around 80% of participating members. Because of the disruption and the 
lack of cooperation from DSD and the fourth block of civil society members, they were 
bypassed in the process. DSD and the fourth block of the United Left subsequently 
organised a press conference, where they publicly expressed their frustration and 
indignation over the procedures. On the day of the inaugural congress of the new Left 
in June 2017, 94 more members left IDS by releasing a public letter of protest over 
what they perceived as an undemocratic breakdown of progressive forces through the 
party’s centralisation. With the formal establishment of the Left, the United Left exists 
in name only, leaving DSD and the fourth bloc outside the Left’s structures. The media 
coverage of the split within the party did not considerably affect the party’s poll 
rankings. Moreover, all of the Left’s MPs come either from IDS and TRS or they are 
no longer members of any of the four constituent groups. This means that the split did 
not destabilise the Left’s parliamentary group. Luka Mesec was reelected as the Left’s 
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coordinator and Violeta Tomić (previously TRS’s leader) was elected as deputy 
coordinator.  
 
It is debatable whether the unification of IDS and TRS signals a break in the relationship 
with social movements. At the level of internal party structures, there is a clear change 
in that there is no symbolic status conferred on affiliated members in the Left, because 
of the way this affiliation was institutionalised within the United Left coalition. If we 
pause to consider how this hybridity between the United Left as a political party and 
social movements worked in practice, however, the fourth bloc was mostly coordinated 
through, and dominated by, a network of a few political groups and activists. Political 
actions were still organised separately by the constituent groups of the United Left, 
most often by IDS and TRS members. There were frequent fights between the different 
constituent parts of the internal party structure. The experience around this hybrid 
institutional channel was therefore one of frustration on both sides. In its new single 
party form, the Left continues its work both in the parliament and out on the streets by 
championing progressive causes. This is demonstrated by the party’s continuing 
cooperation with trade unions and its engagement in various political actions, such as 
participation in public sector strikes and in the 2016 strike in support of the Port of 
Koper’s workers.  
 
With the organisational move towards further centralisation and uniformisation, it 
remains to be seen whether this change will be followed by moderation in the 
ideological profile of the party. From interviews with the Left’s leader Luka Mesec, it 
transpires that these changes in such a relatively short time-span were largely driven by 
an accelerated sense of perceived urgency to turn the tide in Slovenia away from a 
neoliberal path, which continues to exacerbate inequality and disintegrate social 
cohesion (see Trampuš 2016). Two possible future trajectories can be envisaged. While 
the first one would continue along the same trajectory with an ideologically hard-core 
democratic socialism and a light populist appeal, the second would take the party away 
from its pronounced ideological hardness towards a populist socialist party.  
 
The first trajectory would uphold the party’s ideological clarity and would keep it close 
to its original principles. Yet, at the same time, it would risk alienating a large swath of 
voters and citizens, who do not self-identify as socialist or left-wing. This could confine 
the party to a relatively small parliamentary force, depriving it of the prospect of 
governing and enacting its political programme. The second trajectory would 
necessitate the watering down of class discourse and a continuation of its anti-elite, 
anti-establishment appeal. As the analysis in the previous section has shown, the Left’s 
programme tilts more towards reformist pragmatism than revolutionary idealism, 
despite the strong Marxist analysis and discourse that are maintained by those 
previously affiliated with IDS. Moreover, the second trajectory would require (re-
)inventing and articulating a new set of signifiers and discourse that would be able to 
transverse the different struggles and cleavages in society. This is what Chantal Mouffe 
and Ernesto Laclau (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Laclau 2005) mean by the idea of building 
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a chain of equivalence, and what can also be called a ‘populist transversality.’ As Juan 
Antonio Gil de los Santos, a representative of Podemos, explains, transversality is ‘the 
act of building majorities,’ ‘building a broad consensus among diverse groups of people 
for things like the defence of free, public and universal healthcare, the social right to 
housing, and regaining lost labour rights’ (Gil de los Santos 2016).  
 
While we can identify attempts at building such a transversality in the Left’s current 
political strategy, this transversality is often couched in Marxist terms. However, the 
recent move towards the centralisation of the party shows that in the leadership of the 
party there is a recognition of the need to build majorities and to take state power. This 
might as well signal a shift in the Left’s discursive strategy and a move towards a 
populist socialist party as the 2018 parliamentary elections are fast approaching. While 
the second trajectory could potentially enable the party to double or, even, triple the 
number of seats in the parliament and would empower it to take its programme to 
governmental corridors, there are noteworthy caveats involved. A resolute shift towards 
a populist socialist party would clearly involve some ideological stretching and 
loosening of ideological coherence. The danger here is that the party becomes just 
another catch-all party, focused solely on increasing electoral support while neglecting 
its original aim of extending democracy and socialising its member base. Considering 
the coalitional nature of government politics in Slovenia, it would also mean that the 
Left would have to compromise on its key programmatic positions, faced with the 
centrist anti-populist front, if it entered a governing coalition as a minor junior party.    
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I sought to explain the reasons behind the emergence and relative 
success of the Left in Slovenia. I did so by using a multi-level analysis of the interaction 
between structural factors and agential strategies.  
 
Overall, the chapter traced the party’s path from its populist inception in the 2012-2013 
protest movement to the formation of a hybrid party-movement, to the creation of a 
uniform party. As in Greece and in Spain, the mass mobilisations that preceded the rise 
of the United Left were its essential precondition. Yet, in order to understand why the 
protests erupted in the first place, wider structural conditions need to be taken into 
consideration. In the context of an economic downturn, the restricted monetary and 
fiscal independence due to the Eurozone rules led governments to implement austerity 
measures and structural reforms, which resulted in the degradation of living conditions 
for people on low incomes. At the time of the protests, the Janez Janša’s right-wing 
government was quickly losing support. This helped to mobilise progressive groups 
and led trade unions to join the movement. The overall low trust in all established 
political parties and the move of Social Democrats towards the centre meant that the 
conditions were ripe for a new left-wing party. Furthermore, the ‘newness’ factor, the 
relative openness of the political system to new political parties, and good media 




Using Luke March’s typology of radical left parties, I placed the Left in between 
democratic socialist and populist socialist parties. The party combines a strong 
ideological core of democratic socialism with a light populist appeal, which is sustained 
by its outsider status and its anti-establishment discourse. Its parliamentary tactics vary 
depending on the ideological motivation and on whether a policy area is shared by its 
competitors. The analysis of a selection of concrete examples demonstrated that the 
party collaborates with other opposition parties when their positions are 
programmatically aligned, and it competes with them when their ideological interests 
diverge. Accordingly, the party is ready to cooperate with the parties in power when 
issues along the cultural dimension need to be defended against right-wing parties. Here 
the party can also be said to be acting as a prolocutor, while challenging other centre-
left parties to remain consistent with their declared culturally liberal values. 
 
The last part of the chapter explored two possible futures trajectories for the Left. I 
argued that a shift towards a stronger left-wing populism in its strategy could clear the 
way for a better electoral performance of the party and could enable it to enter 
government. Regardless of which of the two trajectories the party follows, it will need 
to continue building its local network of supporters by increasing its membership and 
non-partisan engagement activities. Moreover, as the experience of Syriza forcefully 
demonstrated, the party will need to come up with concrete policy proposals to resolve 
some critical issues beleaguering the European continent. Without a strategy to ensure 
equitable economic development, which would be based on a new model of state’s role 
in the economy, the Slovenian Left will hardly be any more equipped to govern than its 
centre-left competitors.  
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i During the post-Yugoslavian transition to free-market capitalism and liberal democracy, all 
established political parties had their turn in coalition governments at one point. With continuing 
gradual destruction of the Slovenian industrial base and the retrenchment of the welfare state after the 
2008 financial crisis, the angry protesters therefore viewed the whole political establishment as bearing 
responsibility for the failed transition. 
ii I elaborate on the organisational shortcomings of the Slovenian radical left in another work (see 
Toplišek & Thomassen forthcoming). 
iii Alongside the three explanatory variables outlined here, Chiocchetti also mentions the role of mass 
mobilisation as the fourth. I have already covered the role of mass mobilisation in the earlier section by 
singling out the 2012-2013 protests as the catalyst behind the emergence of the United Left, so this is not 
included here. 
iv At the Left’s inaugural congress, the delegates voted to use ‘coordinator,’ instead of ‘president,’ as 
the leader’s title. This was a practice adopted from IDS.  
v See Chapter 6 on ‘Intellectuals’ in Steve Jones’ Antoni Gramsci (2006). 
vi The data is recorded and compiled by the Information Sector of the National Assembly, which is then 
aggregated and visually presented by an independent project Parlameter.si as part of the institute Danes 
je nov dan (see Parlameter 2017). 
                                                          
